Illegal Ponds in Colorado: More Than Just a Drop in the Bucket?
Kate Mailliard • November 19, 2018

In a state where every drop counts, the pressure on Colorado to regulate and maintain a stable water-supply system is intense. Water administrators must constantly be vigilant to ensure there is enough water to meet the needs of the state and to fulfill downstream obligations. As the challenges presented by climate change and increased demand become more visceral, the State will need to start cracking down on something that—on first look—might seem quite innocuous: illegal ponds. However, ponds pose more than a few challenges to make enforcement worthwhile, and the State’s Division of Water Resources (“DWR”) is looking into how they could regulate them efficiently and fairly.

 

Looking to the future, Colorado’s State Water Plan anticipates a gap between the supply and demand for water in municipalities that get their water from the Arkansas Basin. Staff in the State’s Division of Water Resources has begun mulling whether more strict enforcement of illegal ponds would be helpful in filling this gap. While there are some problems associated with the logistics of the stricter enforcement of ponds, the potential for saving necessary water is there.

 

According to Assistant Division Engineer for Division 2 Bill Tyner, there are well over 15,000 pond-like structures that do not have decreed water rights or do not fall into another category of legal water storage. Of these 15,000, though, some structures are natural occurring areas, like wetlands, that would not be subject to the water administrative process. Tyner said, “the inventory of unknown ponds consists of approximately 10,000 surface acres” depending on hydrologic conditions and the level of current storage, and “an average rate of evaporation would suggest that the loss to evaporation could be as high as 30,000 acre-feet per year.” The typical pond holds between 0.5 and 1 acre-feet of water.

 

For context, the State’s 2015 Water Plan predicts the Arkansas River Basin will face a water-demand gap in coming years. The Plan suggests that future needs in the basin, otherwise known as Colorado’s Water Division 2, are expected to increase by 110,000 to 170,000 acre-feet in 2050, while currently planned projects in the Basin leave a supply gap of between 45,000 and 94,000 acre-feet for the same period.

 

Sustained gaps in water supply pose a risk to Division 2 and to the State as a whole. Colorado’s water sources must supply the State’s municipalities, agriculture, and industry but still comply with any interstate compacts, such as the Arkansas River Compact executed between Kansas and Colorado. Failure to comply with the Compact has previously resulted in Colorado paying millions of dollars of damages to Kansas.

 

One way to help fill the gap in Division 2 might be for regulators in the State Engineer’s Office to crack down on the large number of illegal ponds peppering the Basin. But closing the gap in Division 2 is not something that DWR is tasked with. While illegal pond enforcement could potentially help close the gap, DWR's priority is fulfilling their duty to administer water rights regardless of any effect on a predicted gap. As Tyner explained, "[DWR] has been given no direction to find water to fill the gap, certainly not through enforcement actions, and discussing enforcement in the context of the water supply gap could lead to the wrong conclusion. . . . [W]e actively seek opportunities to discourage and prevent new un-exempted and un-augmented ponds from being developed.”

 

Tyner also cautioned against linking the potential savings from pond enforcement to the size of the gap too closely: any comparison between the two, he said, is really just to highlight the scope of the problem. "Our past comparisons relating to the amount of water evaporating from the ponds or stored out-of-priority may indeed show an amount that could be as much as the Arkansas basin gap, however that contrast of data was intended to demonstrate the magnitude of the losses from ponds, not to suggest a solution to the demand gap," he added.

 

This article will address first, the current enforcement process; next, the complications involved with the current process; and finally, a new approach to pond enforcement that could take effect in the near future.

 

Current Enforcement

So far, Division 2 has had some success working with the owners of ponds who, usually without knowledge that what they are doing is illegal, are diverting water out of priority. Typically, when the Division locates a pond that is diverting water out of priority, an enforcement order informs the pond owners that a change must be made. This could mean draining the illegal pond or halting diversions from a nearby water source.

 

During drought years, the Division typically receives complaints from senior water rights holders who know they are losing water to ponds belonging to residents who don’t have water rights or who are junior in time. The Division then notifies the owners of the ponds, explaining they either need to apply for an augmentation plan or stop diverting water to their pond. Tyner said that once notified, pond owners usually comply with any enforcement orders. If successful enforcement like this were to become more frequent, the closure of more illegal ponds could aid Division 2 in obtaining more water to solve the projected gap and to help comply with the Arkansas River Compact.

 

When there is a gap in water supply, one place to look for more water are wells that are pumping out of priority. Before the 1969 Act, which codified Colorado’s system of prior appropriation, there were no requirements for wells to be adjudicated in the priority system. Now, the state recognizes two classes of wells: those that are exempt from the water rights administration and those that are non-exempt and are governed by the priority system. Regulation of non-exempt wells ensures senior water rights holders are getting the water they are entitled to. But according to Tyner, unintended consequences arise from state exemption statutes. Tyner said there are tens of thousands of exempt wells that statute treats as not having an impact on the priority system, even though they may. In more recent water court cases, the state has cracked down on exempt wells in recognition of their effect on the priority system, like in Well Augmentation Subdistrict of Central. Colorado Water Conservancy District v. City of Aurora. Tyner said that there is no strong emphasis on closing ponds like there is on closing wells.

 

Under Colorado law, storing water in a pond requires a storage right unless the pond is included in a plan for augmentation or substitute water supply plan (But even then, Tyner said owners are encouraged to obtain a storage right). One exception to the storage right requirement is when the Division Engineer determines that no senior call exists below the pond; however, this has only happened a few times in the last thirty years. Another exception is when, as determined by the Water Commissioner and the Division Engineer, the curtailment of the storage would not serve to fulfill a downstream call. So, unless a pond has a storage right (or is part of an augmentation plan) or there is an exception, the Division Engineer can curtail use of the pond. The problem, however, is the large number of small ponds dotting the Basin, making enforcement complicated.

 

One uncertainty, according to Bill Tyner, is how much water is actually lost to these rogue ponds. In some ways, this uncertainty provides an advantage for Colorado because Kansas, for example, would have a tough time arguing that ponds are an issue under the Arkansas River Compact simply because ponds do not have as strong of ties to the system as say wells—although wells used to be less strictly enforced as well. But it is clear to Tyner that ponds are diminishing the supply in some way.

 

Enforcement Complications

Why haven’t enforcement orders been issued to every illegal pond in hopes of saving Division 2 as much water as possible? The idea is not as simple as it may sound.

 

First, locating illegal ponds is difficult. While Division 2 contains some populous cities like Pueblo and Colorado Springs, it also comprises a lot of rural area. Tyner said water commissioners can use aerial photos to identify ponds, but typically enforcement orders arise as responses to specific injury concerns from senior water right holders. When a senior water right holder makes a call on the river, junior water right holders must stop diverting water from the system. When pond owners are unaware that they are continuing to divert water out of priority, this still injures those senior right holders. Also, there are various ponds that have legitimate reasons to exist and are in compliance with the Division of Water Resources. Some examples of these types of ponds are livestock water storage ponds and exposed gravel pit ponds, both of which may be permitted by the State Engineer. This makes it difficult to determine which ponds are noncompliant unless there has been a specific complaint.

 

Second, increased enforcement of ponds would require more Division staff and resources focused on this issue. Tyner said the Division has not made pond enforcement a high enough priority yet, but he previously saw the Division “staff up” when Kansas sued the state under the Arkansas River Compact. The Compact was made in 1948 to settle disputes over the waters of the Arkansas River, which runs through both Kansas and Colorado. In the past, when Kansas sued Colorado for failing to provide enough water under the Compact, the Division of Water Resources was forced to administer more personnel to enforce post-Compact wells under the threat of paying damages. If Kansas sues Colorado again, a similar “staff up” for pond enforcement could be required.

 

Additional factors complicating pond enforcement include the time it takes to ensure property owners remove illegal ponds, as well as the hardship enforcement might have on the pond owners themselves. Tyner said when the water commissioner first contacts the owners of illegal ponds, the owners are often surprised and unsure what to do. Considering the complicated nature of Colorado water law, the commissioner gives owners a few months to comply with enforcement orders.

 

Remedies vary depending on whether the pond is “on-channel” or “off-channel.” An on-channel pond is one that a natural stream runs through. If a pond owner is storing water out-of-priority or they do not have a storage right, the owner may be asked to release any water stored in their on-channel pond. This may require the dam for the pond to be breached. An off-channel pond diverts water from the stream. The remedy for illegal off-channel ponds is the cessation of all diversions to the pond. Pond owners can request an extension of time to comply with the enforcement order, which the Division typically grants. Tyner said in very few situations do people refuse to comply with the order; and in even fewer instances, a fine is imposed. On the rare occasions owners simply refuse to comply with the Division’s requests, the Attorney General's Office must file a complaint on behalf of the Division Engineers with the court. Most owners who initially refuse to comply end up signing a Consent Decree that identifies how they will comply with the order and by what date. Tyner said if the Division gets to this point, the owner must pay penalties.

 

Ultimately, given the time and resources needed, it is unrealistic to expect that a swift wave of enforcement against illegal ponds will have an immediate impact on the water system. At the same time, any solution should be considered given that Colorado will face continue to face challenges in complying with the Arkansas River Compact. In 2005, Colorado paid Kansas more than $34 million in damages for Compact violations caused by years of well pumping that depleted river flows at the state line—a situation that no one would like to see repeated.

 

"Although enforcement is not a tool intended to close the gap, we recognize that additional out-of-priority uses, particularly in an over appropriated basin, only make it more difficult to protect existing senior water rights and address legitimate future needs and so, through education and interdiction we actively seek opportunities to discourage and prevent new un-exempted and un-augmented ponds from being developed," Tyner said.

 

Proposed New Approach

In preparation for the September Orders Committee Meeting, Tyner drafted a memo to the Division of Water Resources Orders Committee in April 2018. In the memo, Tyner proposed a new approach to pond enforcement orders. The approach embraces a strict timeline for the emptying of ponds, as well as strict conditions for the refilling of ponds with approved augmentation plans. The harsher approach comes with time saving benefits for the water commissioner, and it seeks to rid of interim compliance problems when ponds are lowered properly but later refilled by rain.

 

Tyner’s memo explained that “it takes and inordinate amount of time to make monthly site visits to confirm compliance or non-compliance with the orders.” The memo outlined an improved process for pond enforcement. Tyner suggested that the Division first order an owner to remove unnecessary obstruction by breaching the dam or, if the pond has adequate operable outlet works, by releasing stored water. Tyner’s memo said orders should include “a show cause statement as to why the water in the pond has been legally stored and, if water can be shown to be legally stored, show how inflows will be passed to prevent injury to downstream water rights when in-priority storage cannot be conducted.”

 

The ideas Tyner suggested also include orders that refer pond owners to dam safety requirements and orders that identify a timeframe for owners to comply with in emptying their ponds. For dam safety, breaching or draining of off-channel ponds should contain a reference to dam safety provisions to avoid “a train wreck” with water being discharged to the stream. And for timeframes, Tyner suggested that for orders issued after September 1, compliance be met by the following April 1; and for orders issued after February 1 and before September 1, he recommended that the owner be required to empty the pond within 45-60 days from receipt of order.

 

Then, an order should apprise the owner of options for obtaining a substitute water supply plan or an augmentation plan for their pond to be refilled. According to Tyner, this should not be given as an option for compliance with the order, but “if someone was able to get approval for a plan over the winter with a provision to handle the initial fill, [the Division] could treat that as compliance with the order.” Further, any substitute water supply plan or augmentation plan approved for refill and fill maintenance on a pond should have strict conditions about operable outlet works.

 

For off-channel ponds, an order should be issued in a similar manner; however, the diversion to the pond should be immediately curtailed. The same considerations in any substitute water supply plan approval should be considered similarly to on-channel ponds, but with added conditions related to proper control and measuring devices on the diverted supply to the pond to allow control by the Water Commissioner.

 

This approach has the potential to simplify the process of pond enforcement, which could aid Division 2 in gaining more water. But even if this approach helps save more water, according to Tyner, “making water available through pond enforcement may not result in water being available at a proper location to solve the problem.” Also, “some landowners with ponds will choose to try to keep their ponds by working to develop augmentation plans to replace out-of-priority depletions”, so figuring out the overall impact of a new enforcement plan would “be a dynamic process” for DWR, Tyner said.

 

While dealing with illegal ponds is not easy, there is potential for Colorado to save a lot of water through stricter enforcement. Much like the way the state revamped its system to regulate wells to comply with the Arkansas River Compact, a stricter regulation of illegal ponds could prove very beneficial to the state.

 

 Sources

Arkansas River Compact of 1949, Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 37-69-101.

 

Bill Vogrin, A pond farewell: State cracks down on water rights violations, Gazette (Sept. 4, 2009) http://gazette.com/a-pond-farewell-state-cracks-down-on-water-rights-violations/article/61473.

 

Citizen’s Guide to Colorado’s Interstate Compacts, Colorado Foundation for Water Education Colorado 16-17 (2nd ed. 2016), https://agriculture.ks.gov/docs/default-source/iwi---kansas-colorado-arkansas-river-compact/arkcompactfactsheetaug2009.pdf?sfvrsn=2.

 

Colorado Water Plan 6-21 (2015), http://cwcbweblink.state.co.us/WebLink/ElectronicFile.aspx?docid=199504&searchid=80d50cb3-95bf-405c-bfa5-587c633c7136&&dbid=0.

 

Guide to Colorado Well Permits, Water Rights, and Water Administration, State of Colorado Department of Natural Resources Division of Water Resources 2 (Sept. 2012), https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/wellpermitguide1.pdf.

 

Telephone Interview with Bill Tyner, Assistant Division Engineer for Division 2, Colorado Division of Water Resources (Feb. 22, 2018).

 

Email correspondence with Bill Tyner, Assistant Division Engineer for Division 2, Colorado Division of Water Resources (Apr. 22, 2018).

 

Kansas Department of Agriculture, Fact Sheet (Aug. 2009), https://agriculture.ks.gov/docs/default-source/iwi---kansas-colorado-arkansas-river-compact/arkcompactfactsheetaug2009.pdf?sfvrsn=2.

By Lexi Kay LeCroy April 25, 2026
Benjamin Franklin once said, “When the well is dry, we’ll know the worth of water.” Unsurprisingly, the precious resource he acknowledged is the same one that people fought and died over. While violent disputes used to provide the typical means to acquire water rights, states since then regulated water ownership in a manner suitable to their geographical location and purposes. Texas and Colorado take their own respective approaches to statutory regulations, particularly when focusing on aquifers. This article compares how Texas Groundwater Conservation Districts and Colorado Ground Water Management Districts regulate aquifer mining and depletion. Both states base their controlling schemes over water rights on the legal principle of “first in time, first in right.” However, Colorado assumed the Prior Appropriation Doctrine, Texas took on a hybrid version—the Rule of Capture. The Texas Legislature refining regulatory bodies governed mainly by said separate entities created by the state legislature supersedes the Rule of Capture. The Rule of Capture’s remnants remain in some of the current governing rules in Texas. Meanwhile, Colorado remains steadfast in its application of Prior Appropriation. Despite having different approaches, Texas and Colorado both created Groundwater Conservation Districts to manage areas statewide with little to no water. This blog focuses specifically on those districts and the statutory foundations upon which they rest. Regardless of the statewide structure governing water rights, both states share similar policy goals. In the face of environmental concerns, such as subsidence and the resulting evolving geological areas, both Texas and Colorado must address the ever-growing need for more water, both in and out of aquifers. I. State Approaches to Aquifer Regulation And Well Spacing A. Texas Groundwater Conservation Districts After the U.S. Constitution and federal laws, the Texas Legislature holds the ultimate authority to enact laws governing water rights and management. It delegates specific powers to state agencies and local entities to implement and enforce the Texas Water Code through the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ). The genuine “boots on the ground” enforcers specific to groundwater management are Groundwater Conservation Districts (GCDs). Texas granted GCDs the authority to regulate well spacing and groundwater production. Statutorily, these GCDs remain the state’s preferred method of groundwater management to preserve property rights across Texas while balancing conservation and development concerns; however, the state not always prioritizes considerations of conservation and development. Historically, Texas followed the Rule of Capture, which allows a landowner to pump water from beneath his or her property, even at the expense of his or her neighbor. The rule established in 1904 by the Texas Supreme Court in Houston & T.C. Ry. V. East, which held that a landowner had no legal remedy against a railroad company that had moved next door and drilled a larger well, causing the landowner’s well to go dry. The court’s simple solution for the landowner: drill a bigger, deeper well than the railroad. Over time, establishing GCDs addressed specific policy concerns and granted regulatory authority over groundwater. To simplify, Texas state law sets the framework; TCEQ rules govern broad permits and quality; and the GCDs manage groundwater production, depletion, and protection. It is interesting to note that, under Texas law, tributary groundwater is not defined separately from non-tributary groundwater. Instead, the statute creates two primary categories of water: surface water and groundwater. The primary focus centers more on each GCD’s ability to adopt rules suitable for each aquifer, subdivision of an aquifer, or geographic area overlying aquifer boundaries. This can account for the unique characteristics of each aquifer, especially when considering the varying climates across the state, as well as to categorize the aquifer’s physical attributes—i.e., what Colorado distinguishes as tributary or non-tributary. GCDs combine the physical characteristics of an aquifer with defining the “ best available science ” to combat issues that may arise. This boils down to utilizing “conclusions that are logically and reasonably derived using statistical or quantitative data, techniques, analyses, and studies that are publicly available to reviewing scientists and can be employed to address a specific question.” The relevant question that arises from this statutory line of thinking is this: Is the reliance on scientific methods too exclusionary of relevant human interests? There seems to be a fine line. While science remains a strong method for determining relevant environmental concerns, it is not always kind to the economic and personal interests of smaller parties, such as farmers and ranchers living in rural areas. B. Colorado Ground Water Management Districts As the state that first developed and implemented the Prior Appropriation Doctrine, Colorado remains known for its water courts and precedent governing all rights to water. The Prior Appropriation system dictates that appropriation occurs when someone removes water from a water source and then puts it to a beneficial use. The first person to take the water and put it to a beneficial use gains priority over subsequent appropriators, and once receiving a court decree verifying status, becomes a senior water right owner relative to subsequent appropriators. Senior owners’ priority over junior water right owners, with the underlying expectation that senior owners’ “call” for water fulfills before any other water owners. Notably, the Colorado Ground Water Management Act of 1965 (GMA) modified said Prior Appropriation system to prevent unreasonable aquifer depletion on Colorado’s Eastern Plains, where notably less water connects to surface streams. The GMA established the Colorado Ground Water Commission (GWC), which governs the Ground Water Management Districts (GWMDs). Both entities have jurisdiction over designated groundwater , which is statutorily distinct from tributary groundwater. Designated groundwater encompasses water located within designated basins that either (1) would not feed into decreed surface water rights, or (2) is in areas lacking a constant natural stream where groundwater serves as the primary water source for at least 15 years prior to the basin’s designation. Essentially, this boils down to water that provides a de minimus impact on surface streams. The GWC holds the authority to adjudicate designated groundwater rights only, as well as issue large capacity well permits. In contrast, the GWMDs represent local districts wherein there is more administrative power within their designated boundaries. GWMDs retain authority to regulate the use, control, and conservation of groundwater within their boundaries. GWMDs can adopt controls and regulations to minimize the lowering of the water table, subject to review and approval by the GWC. If anything, this specific governance over designated groundwater provides a balance of economic development with aquifer sustainability. II. Regulatory Mechanisms to Handle Drawdown & Depletion A. Texas Texas GCDs intend to regulate groundwater production to minimize aquifer drawdown, prevent subsidence, and protect water quality. To do this, GCDs can adopt rules to regulate well spacing to prevent well-to-well interference and reduce the depletion risk. GCDs can also limit groundwater production based on acreage and impose production limits to ensure sustainable aquifer use. GCDs consider a multitude of factors when implementing rules specific to drawdown and depletion regulation, including, but not limited to, hydrological conditions, recharge rates, and socioeconomic impacts, when estimating desired future conditions for aquifers. Further, Texas Water Code Chapter 36 grants GCDs discretion to regulate groundwater production to preserve historic or existing uses. The main workhorse provision for dealing with well-to-well interference and localized depletion focuses on district regulation of well spacing and production to prevent waste and the protection of groundwater reservoirs. Many GCD rules base production limits on acreage or tract size and impose minimum spacing between wells to reduce interference between cones of depression and avoid unreasonable impacts on existing wells. At the same time, other statutory requirements require most non-exempt wells to obtain permits, and districts must evaluate those well applications against their management plans and the regional “ desired future conditions .” Those desired future conditions essentially act as a statutory cap on how much depletion is acceptable in a particular aquifer. These implementations layer over the Rule of Capture, as well as case law, which push districts to balance their state-mandated code with potential takings claims when they limit pumping too aggressively. B. Colorado Colorado GWMDs, on the other hand, govern designated groundwater, and the aquifers they govern are already facing long-term depletion. Instead of the pure conservation mandate that Texas possesses, Colorado’s statutes primarily focus on preventing “unreasonable injury” or “material injury” to existing water rights, as laid out in specific well-permitting provisions. The Colorado Supreme Court previously interpreted these statutes to mean that prior appropriators are not entitled to a “frozen” water table; i.e., that some drawdown is statutorily allowed so long as it does not unreasonably impair earlier wells. Colorado’s permitting rules directly tie into well-to-well interference and aquifer mining. The GWC has to decide whether unappropriated groundwater is available and whether a proposed well will cause material injury to vested rights. It can deny or limit permits with conditions to follow if those standards are not met. In some situations, Colorado law requires augmentation or replacement plans, which provide means to replace depletions to avoid injury. Unlike Texas’s future conditions consideration, Colorado does not always aim to meet a specific target of drawdown; instead, the “unreasonable injury” and “material injury” language function as a legal limit for how much aquifer decline is tolerated within a designated basin. II. Challenges & Policy Considerations A. Comparison of the Challenges Each State Faces One of the biggest challenges that Texas must consider is that its framework sits on top of the old Rule of Capture background, while also telling GCDs that they are supposed to conserve and protect the water that landowners think they own. The Texas Water Code recognized that landowners have “ ownership of groundwater in place .” It then clarifies how that ownership is defined by stating that it is subject to “ regulation under this chapter and under the rules adopted by a district.” At the same time, another section lays out what seems like an ambitious policy: districts must provide for “the conservation, preservation, protection, recharging, and prevention of waste of groundwater and of groundwater reservoirs or their subdivisions, and to control subsidence caused by withdrawal of groundwater.” In other words, GCDs essentially respect private property rights but also keep aquifers from being mined and the land from sinking, which is a bit of a tightrope. Texas courts also added pressure by recognizing takings-like claims in groundwater regulation. The Texas Supreme Court previously acknowledged in Edwards Aquifer Authority v. Day that landowners possess a constitutionally protected interest in groundwater in place, and district regulations that go “too far” could potentially be held responsible for providing compensation. This could reasonably make a district nervous about utilizing the full extent of its statutory powers under provisions governing spacing and production, or even permitting, to really clamp down on drawdown and depletion. Thus, a district might actually be squeezed from three directions at once: landowners invoking precedent, regional desired future conditions that say “you can’t pump that much,” and a statutory conservation and subsidence mandate that doesn’t really create a clear safe harbor. It is not shocking that implementation looks uneven from district to district. Colorado’s challenges look a little different because the foundational system is Prior Appropriation, but many of the practical roadblocks are similar. The Colorado GMA creates the category of “designated groundwater” and puts it under the jurisdiction of the Colorado GWC and local GWMDs. While considering the plain language of the statute seems clarifying, in reality, figuring out what is designated versus tributary, and how much connection there is to streams, can be complicated and politically touchy. Additionally, the GMA assumes that some level of aquifer mining will occur and then tries to keep it within tolerable bounds, which, in theory, is logical. The GWC is supposed to issue large capacity well permits only when there is unappropriated groundwater and when existing rights won’t suffer substantial injury. As noted in Jaegar v. Colorado Ground Water Commission, the Colorado Supreme Court made it clear that prior appropriators in designated basins do not guarantee that the water table will stay where it was when they drilled; rather, the GMA protects from unjustified impairment. This gives the GWC and the local districts some flexibility, but also means that they must make controversial judgment calls about how much decline is too much. The Colorado Supreme Court also stressed that the GWC must weigh economic development and beneficial use against aquifer conditions when deciding whether additional wells are compatible with statutory standards. Thus, it seems that Colorado regulators constantly balance the statutory foundation of Prior Appropriation against the explicit decision in the GMA to allow planned depletion. B. Takeaways Each State Could Learn from The Other One obvious notion that Colorado might learn from Texas is how to be more explicit about conservation and subsidence in the text of the statutes. Texas regulations remain quite blunt in stating that GCDs exist to conserve and preserve groundwater, recharge aquifers, prevent waste, and “ control subsidence caused by withdrawal of groundwater.” That clear-cut statement of policy gives Texas districts a straightforward rule when they adopt strict spacing or production limits or when they justify denying permits. While Colorado’s designated-basin provisions in Title 37 speak about “beneficial use” and “material injury,” those provisions are less direct about long-term conservation goals. As climate change and long-term declines start to intensify, Colorado might benefit from adding a more modern conservation and aquifer-protection policy section. Colorado could also look at Texas’s “desired future conditions” approach as a model for more explicit basin-wide planning. Texas code requires districts within a specific GCD area to adopt said conditions for each relevant aquifer, and then the Texas governing authority uses those estimated future standards to create modeled available groundwater values that effectively set a ceiling on permissible pumping. This process forces a collective conversation about how much drawdown is acceptable by a given year, which is quite necessary when considering juggling economic and environmental interests along with consumptive and domestic uses. Colorado’s GWC and GWMDs already retain their own authority to adopt basin rules, but there is less emphasis on calculating a specific future condition for the aquifer. Borrowing a concept such as a “designated basin future condition” could give stakeholders in Colorado a clearer sense of how the law is trying to guide long-term aquifer conditions, rather than leaving that mostly implicit in GWC decisions. On the flip side, Texas might take a page from Colorado’s more candid treatment of aquifer mining and the concept of “unreasonable injury” in designated basins. The GMA basically admits that some aquifers will draw down over time, but insists that the drawdown managed so existing appropriators are not unreasonably or materially injured. Case law reinforces the idea that regulators should determine what decline is manageable and consistent with statutory standards, and then enforce that line. Texas’s “desired future conditions” framework does something similar in practice, but the statutory text is not strong enough to fully meet this bar. While some Texas code discusses conservation and planning, primary pieces of the code do not squarely address that, in some places, the political choice might be to allow a controlled mining of the aquifer to support agriculture or municipal growth for a limited time. Adding clearer verbiage about when and how planned depletion is allowed may make the entirety of the Texas Water Code more honest and, arguably, easier to defend in court. Texas could also learn from Colorado’s more formal standard for material injury to protect existing users. In designated basins, the Colorado GWC must deny or issue conditional permits if doing so would cause material injury to vested water right owners. Texas districts certainly mention protecting “historic use” and preventing waste, and are supposed to consider socio-economic impacts and aquifer conditions when setting “desired future conditions,” but the code does not provide explicit parameters for when the changes to an existing well are deemed unacceptable. Taking a more explicit, “no unreasonable impairment of existing wells” standard and embedding it in the Texas code could help districts justify tougher decisions to cut permitted amounts or deny new wells in already lowered or stressed areas. III. Conclusion Texas and Colorado carved out their own statutory paths to address aquifer mining, depletion, and drawdown that reflects each state’s distinct legal traditions and environmental considerations. Texas relies on locally driven GCDs, guided by somewhat vague, broad conservation and subsidence control goals. Colorado’s GWMDs, created under the GMA, establishes a regime for designated groundwater, setting acceptable limits on aquifer decline through the Prior Appropriation standard. Both systems illustrate the difficulty of using law to ration a finite renewable resource. Overall, these systems suggest that future statutory refinements should focus on sharpening planning goals by integrating climate considerations and creating clearer statutory standards through updated terminology for the tolerable level of drawdown to support economic development and water-supply reliability. SOURCES Tex. Const., Art. XVI, § 59(a). Tex. Water Code § 5.013. Tex. Water Code § 36.116; see also Tex. Water Code § 36.101. Houston & T.C. Ry. v. East, 81 S.W.279, 280 (Tex. 1904). Id. Tex. Water Code § 36.001. See § 36.116. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-103. Tex. Water Code § 36.0015(a). Id. Water Rights, Colo. Div. of Water Rights, https://dwr.colorado.gov/services/water-administration/water-rights . Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-101; see also Jaeger v. Colo. Ground Water Com., 746 P.2d 515, 520, 523 (Colo. 1987). Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-103. Colo. Ground Water Comm’n, Colo. Div. of Water Rights, https://dwr.colorado.gov/public-information/boards-and- commissions#:~:text=Colorado%20Ground%20Water%20Commission%20(CGWC,(Division% 20of%20Water%20Resources). Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-130. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-131. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-111; see generally Front Range Res., LLC v. Colo. Ground Water Comm’n, 415 P.3d 807, 811 (Colo. 2018). Tex. Water Code § 36.0015(a). § 36.116; see also Tex. Special Dist. Loc. L. Code § 8887.103. Tex. Water Code § 36.108. § 36.116. Id.; see also Tex. Water Code § 36.101. Id. See Tex. Water Code § 36.1132; Tex. Water Code § 36.1071; Tex. Water Code § 36.108. § 36.108. See generally Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 832-33 (Tex. 2012). Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-137. Jaeger, 746 P.2d at 520, 523. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-137. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-103(12.7); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-305. § 37-90-137. Tex. Water Code § 36.002. Id. Tex. Water Code § 36.0015. See Edwards Aquifer Auth., 369 S.W.3d at 832-833. Tex. Water Code § 36.116; Tex. Water Code § 36.113. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-103. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-137. See Jaeger, 746 P.2d at 520, 523. See id. See Front Range Res., LLC, 415 P.3d at 811-12. Tex. Water Code § 36.116. See id.; see also https://dwr.colorado.gov/public-information/boards-and- commissions#:~:text=Colorado%20Ground%20Water%20Commission%20(CGWC,(Division% 20of%20Water%20Resources). See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-137. See Tex. Water Code § 36.108. Id. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-131. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-137. See Jaeger, 746 P.2d at 520, 523; see also Front Range Res., LLC, 415 P.3d at 811-12. See Tex. Water Code § 36.108. See Tex. Water Code § 36.0015. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-137. See Tex. Water Code § 36.116; see also Tex. Water Code 36.108. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-137; see Jaeger, 746 P.2d at 520, 523.
By Haley Zahratka April 25, 2026
I. INTRODUCTION The Utah Board of Water Resources (UBWR) proposed the Lake Powell Pipeline Project (LPP) to address increasing water demands in Washington County, Utah. The pipeline is projected to be approximately 141 miles long, diverting water from the Colorado River, beginning at Lake Powell near the Glen Canyon Dam and ending in Washington County, Utah. The pipeline diverts water from Utah’s Upper Basin allocation, but its ultimate use remains in the Lower Basin. The “Law of the River,” which governs the Colorado River, comprises of federal laws, court decisions and decrees, contracts, regulatory provisions, and interstate compacts. The guidelines for the Colorado River expired in 2025, and a new management plan must exist by the fall of 2026. The Upper and Lower Basin states must reach an agreement on how to allocate the Colorado River, or the federal government will step in. The Law of the River does not provide explicit guidelines on whether Upper Basin water can be used in the Lower Basin; however, textual interpretation, common law, concerns about precedent, and the existence of other alternatives indicate that other options should be explored before the LPP is constructed. This blog post discusses the details of the LPP, stakeholder positions on the LPP, the laws that govern the Colorado River, interpretations of the Compacts of 1922 and 1948, relevant case law, the policy implications of the LPP, and, lastly, potential resolutions. II. LAKE POWELL PIPELINE PROJECT The UBWR proposed constructing the LPP to transport water from the Lake Powell Reservoir by pipeline approximately 141 miles to Washington County, Utah, delivering up to 86,249 acre-feet of water. The LPP water is allocated to Utah but remains used in the Lower Basin within Utah. In 2006 the Utah State Legislature passed the Lake Powell Pipeline Development Act, which authorized the construction of the LPP. The US Bureau of Reclamation published a Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS), recommending the Southern Alternative as the preferred alternative for the LPP. The DEIS states that this alternative would meet Washington County’s water needs by 2060, as it is economical, provides water security, complies with the Lake Powell Pipeline Development Act, and does not require tribal agreement. The permitting process for the project remains paused since 2020, due to resistance from surrounding states. The DEIS was published in June of 2020, and on September 8, 2020, in response, the Colorado River Basin states requested that a Final EIS not be approved until all seven states reached an agreement regarding the project. Nonprofit groups called for the pipeline’s removal from the permitting process on December 18, 2023, stating that the Colorado River does not have excess water for the pipeline and that this should not maintain priority over other Colorado River water right issues. III. STAKEHOLDER POSITIONS The LPP’s proponents argue that the pipeline is needed to diversify the water supply and provide a reliable water source for residents of Washington County. The county is projected to have a population increase of 155% by 2060, and receives over six million visitors, with seasonal residents owning 20% of the homes. Proponents argue that the pipeline will protect the environment by keeping water flowing through the Colorado River system, ensuring the health of the ecosystem. The pipeline alleges to promote the economy by keeping employers in the state and to prevent drought by providing additional water supplies and storage. The primary LPP proponents include state and federally elected officials, such as Senator Mike Lee, as well as many local industry and utility providers, community leaders, and municipalities. Various grassroots groups oppose the LPP . The Utah Rivers Council (URC) contends that the pipeline is unnecessary, expensive, and destructive. The URC states that Washington County consumes water at more than double the national average because of low water rates, and that population growth has been exaggerated. The URC alleges that the pipeline will cost at least 2.24 billion dollars of taxpayer money, which will increase water and property taxes. The URC states that this will disturb wildlife, spread invasive species, and reduce water flows in the Grand Canyon. If the Colorado River experiences only a 9% decline in flow, a 3.2 million acre feet (maf) water demand-supply imbalance will result. The Western Resource Advocates argue that the prepared DEIS does not account for projected increases in water efficiency, thereby inflating water demand. IV. BACKGROUND The Colorado River Compact of 1922 divided states into the Upper and Lower Basin. Colorado, Wyoming, Utah, and New Mexico make up the Upper Basin, while Arizona, Nevada, and California make up the Lower Basin. Upper Basin water is comprised of the parts of the Upper Basin states where water from the Colorado River drains above Lees Ferry. The same provision controls the Lower Basin, but for waters below Lees Ferry. The Colorado River Compact, however, is wrought with miscalculations. When the Compact was drafted, it was believed that there was between 17 and 20 maf of water to allocate and therefore allocated 7.5 maf to each basin. This calculation was made during a period of unusually high water flows, and therefore, allocates more water allocated than available. The Compact also requires the Upper Basin to ensure at least 7.5 maf are delivered annually to the Lower Basin. Additionally, the Upper and Lower Basins must each deliver half of the annual 1.5 maf requirement under the 1944 U.S.-Mexico treaty. The Upper Basin states have a legal obligation to deliver this water, and if they do not, they may be subject to a “Compact Call” requiring the Upper Basin to reduce its water use to satisfy that obligation. This would have serious implications for major cities in Upper Basin states, as many possess water rights that are junior to the Compact.  The Upper Colorado River Basin Compact of 1948 allocates water among the upper-basin states. After deducting the obligations required to comply with the 1922 Compact, Colorado is allocated 51.75%, Utah 23%, Wyoming 14%, and New Mexico 11.25%. The Compact of 1948 provides that if there is a Compact Call, water rights senior to November 24, 1922, are not subject to the call. The Colorado River Storage Project Act (CRPSA) came afterward to provide a stable system that allowed the Upper Basin states to make full use of their allocated water. The enactment of the CRPSA led to the authorization of the Flaming Gorge Dam and Reservoir, the Glen Canyon Dam, and Lake Powell. Lake Powell is the primary means of sending water to the Lower Basin. Beginning in 2000, the Colorado River system began to face drought concerns. This led to the 2007 Interim Guidelines, but with these guidelines expiring soon, new management guidelines are crucial. V. COMPACT INTERPRETATION The LPP raises the question of whether water from Utah’s Upper Basin can be used in St. George, Utah, in the Lower Basin. The Colorado River Compact of 1922 defines the Upper Basin as the portions of Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming whose waters naturally flow into the Colorado River system. In Article VIII, it states, “[a]ll other rights to beneficial use of waters of the Colorado River System shall be satisfied solely from the water apportioned to that Basin in which they are situate.” This language seems to imply that water allocated to a basin must be used in that basin. However, the Compact of 1948 allocated 23% of Upper Basin consumptive water use generally to the State of Utah, not just the part of the state that is part of the Upper Basin. Additionally, the 1948 Compact subjected to the terms of the 1922 Compact, designates Upper Basin water based on drainage into the Colorado River, and no specific provision governs transbasin use in either Compact Agreement. Therefore, neither the 1922 nor the 1948 Compact provide explicit clarity on whether the use of Upper Basin water in the Lower Basin is permitted. VI. CASE LAW ANALYSIS Equitable apportionment, a federal common law doctrine, governs disputes between states as it pertains to their rights to interstate streams. The doctrine prevents states from forcing other states to follow the same water law system. Equitable apportionment aims to create a just allocation by considering many factors. The prior appropriation system primarily guides allocation, but physical conditions, climate, rate of return flow, consumptive use, storage water availability, and downstream or upstream impacts are all considered relevant. As states face the question of moving Upper Basin water for use in the Lower Basin, looking to a balancing test such as equitable apportionment offers a case-by-case analysis approach that is essential to an area of law as complex as the Law of the River. When applying this test to the LPP, the lack of storage water and the impact this would have on Lower Basin users weigh heavily against the construction of the LPP. Further, in Arizona v. California, the Supreme Court held that the Secretary of the Interior had broad powers to manage the Colorado River in the Lower Basin. The Secretary was not required to follow prior appropriation laws when allocating water. If the states of the Upper and Lower Basin are unable to come to a comprehensive interstate compact before the current guidelines expire, the LPP could also be subject to being decided by the Court and implemented by the Secretary, rather than being left up to the states to decide. VII. POLICY IMPLICATIONS If the LPP project receives a permit, it may set a precedent for other Upper Basin states to take similar actions, especially since the 1922 and 1948 Compacts do not explicitly bar interbasin transfers. If the LPP uses Utah’s allocated Upper Basin water for use in the Lower Basin, other Upper Basin states that do not utilize their full allocation may also attempt to take advantage of this “loophole.” However, Lake Powell continues to face lowered water level concerns. By December 2026, the water level may drop to a level at which hydropower cannot be generated. If Upper Basin states become more concerned with ensuring they receive what they are allocated, rather than focusing on renegotiating a water compact that addresses shortages, we will face an even more severe crisis in the coming years. VIII. POTENTIAL RESOLUTIONS The LPP is not the only solution to address concerns regarding access to water. Washington County could restructure its tax system to prevent water waste. The Washington County Water District (WCWD) collects enough money from property taxes that it enables the County to provide lower water rates. Washington County’s per-person water use is among the highest in the U.S., likely due to inexpensive water. WCWD could eliminate these property taxes, a tax most water districts do not collect in the West. This would benefit taxpayers and discourage water waste. Washington County could also install water meters, which could curtail secondary water use, just by showing users how much water they use. Secondary water users pay only an annual fee and therefore have no idea how much water they use, with some secondary water users overwatering by more than 100 percent. Resolutions such as these should be explored before removing water from Lake Powell. IX. CONCLUSION The LPP confronts an area of uncertainty regarding the 1922 and 1948 Compacts. When examining the language of these Compacts, nothing explicitly prevents the LPP from using Upper Basin water for Lower Basin use. However, the doctrine of Equitable Apportionment seems to indicate that if the LPP were to be litigated, it would not be found to be a reasonable measure, given the lack of water availability and the potential policy implications. Therefore, I advocate taking alternative approaches, such as restructuring Washington County’s tax structure or installing meters before constructing the proposed 141 mile pipeline. SOURCES U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Lake Powell Pipeline Project Draft Environmental Impact Statement (2020). The Law of The River, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, (March 2008), https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g1000/lawofrvr.html Ishan Thakore, A Colorado River Deadline Looms, Here Is What’s at Stake for Colorado, CPR News (Nov. 10, 2025, 3:15 PM), https://www.cpr.org/2025/11/10/colorado-river-negoations-impact-colorado/ Colorado River Compact, Nov. 24, 1922, https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/pao/pdfiles/crcompct.pdf Devin Stetler, In This Issue: Sustainable Infrastructure: Toward a Utah Intentionally Created Surplus Program, 22 Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol’y. 4, 7 (2022). Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, Oct. 11, 1948, https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g1000/pdfiles/ucbsnact.pdf Lake Powell Pipeline, PERMITTING DASHBOARD, https://www.permits.performance.gov/permitting-project/other-projects/lake-powell-pipeline (last visited Dec. 16, 2025). 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